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Abstract
We investigate an evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game among self-
driven agents, where collective motion of biological flocks is imitated
through averaging directions of neighbors. Depending on the temptation
to defect and the velocity at which agents move, we find that cooperation
can not only be maintained in such a system but there exists an optimal
size of interaction neighborhood, which can induce the maximum cooper-
ation level. When compared with the case that all agents do not move,
cooperation can even be enhanced by the mobility of individuals, provided
that the velocity and the size of neighborhood are not too large. Besides,
we find that the system exhibits aggregation behavior, and cooperators
may coexist with defectors at equilibrium.
Keywords: cooperation,flocks,evolutionary games,prisoner’s dilemma
1 Introduction
Cooperation is commonly observed in genomes, cells, multi-cellular organisms,
social insects, and human society, but Darwin’s theory of evolution implies
fierce competition for existence among selfish and unrelated individuals. In past
decades, much effort has been devoted to understanding the mechanisms behind
the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. In this context, the prisoner’s
dilemma game is a widely used model to illustrate the conflict between selfish
and cooperative behavior.
The traditional prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game is a two-player game, where
each player can choose either cooperation (C) or defection (D). Mutual cooper-
ation pays each a reward R, while mutual defection brings each a punishment
P . If one player chooses to cooperate while the other prefers to defect, the
cooperator obtains the sucker’s payoff S and the defector gains the temptation
T . The four payoff values satisfy the following conditions: T > R > P > S and
2R > S + T . According to the inequalities, defection is the optimal strategy
to maximize payoff for a selfish player in a one-shot game, no matter what the
opponent dose. But the total income of two defectors is lower than that of two
cooperators. Hence the dilemma arises, and defection is evolutionarily stable in
a well-mixed population [1].
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The spatial PD games have attracted much attention since Nowak and
May reported the stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors in a two-
dimensional lattice [2]. After that, many works have been done to add ran-
domness to the deterministic game dynamics. For example, the noise can be
introduced based on the payoff difference, which allows an inferior strategy to be
followed with certain probability [3]. The mapping of game payoffs to individ-
ual fitness can follow different distributions, which accounts for social diversity
[4]. And in the dynamic preferential selection model, the more frequently a
neighbor’s strategy is adopted by the focal player, the larger probability will be
chosen to refer to in the subsequent rounds [5]. Besides, networks describing
connections among individuals have also been also extended from lattices to
complex networks [6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. For more details about spatial evolutionary
games, please see Ref. [11, 12, 13] and references therein.
In spatial games mentioned above, players are located on the vertices of the
network, and edges among vertices determine who plays with whom. Often the
network is assumed to be static. However, in real social systems, the network size
may continuously change as individuals join or quit, and the network structure
can also evolve as links are created or broken. It has been reported that co-
evolution constitutes a key mechanism for the sustainability of cooperation in
dynamic networks [14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19].
For a network, the movement of individuals may either change its size or its
structure. For example, when people drive, cell phones connect with different
base stations in the mobile communication network. And moving house brings
one new neighbors in the acquaintance network. In fact, the motion of individ-
uals is an important characteristic of the social network [20], and the patterns
of human mobility have drawn much attention in the past years [21, 22]. When
the spatial structure has been introduced, it is natural to consider the evolution
of cooperation in mobile individuals.
By intuition the introduction of mobility would lead to the dominance of
defection because mobile defectors can expect more cooperators to employ than
that of the static network, and escape retaliation of former partners by running
away. Yet, the correlation between cooperation and mobility is more complex
than intuition. Mobility could affect the origin of altruism, while the rise of
altruism cost would lead to an evolutionary reduction of mobility [23]. With a
win-stay, lose-shift rule cooperation would be evolutionary stable under gener-
alized reciprocity [24]. Further, in agent-based models, mobility of individuals
can be involved explicitly as the movement of agents. “Walk Away”, a sim-
ple strategy of contingent movement, can outperform complex strategies under
a number of conditions [25]. And success-driven migration may promote the
spontaneous outbreak of cooperation in a noisy world, which is dominated by
selfishness and defection [26]. Even in a blind pattern of mobility, cooperation
is not only possible but may also be enhanced for a broad range of parameters,
when compared with the case that all agents never move [27, 28, 29].
In the present work we study the evolution of cooperation among mobile
players, which are allowed to move in a two-dimensional plane without periodic
boundary conditions. The movement of every agent is non-contingent, imitating
the direction alignment process in biological flocks. We find that there exists
an optimal size of interaction neighborhood, which can induce the maximum
cooperation level. When compared with the case that all agents do not move,
cooperation can not only be maintained but even be enhanced by the movement
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of players. We also investigate the dependence of the cooperator frequency on
the density of agents, and the coexistence of different strategies is illustrated.
2 The Model
Let xi(t) and θi(t), i = 1, 2, ...N , denote the position and moving direction of
the agent i at time t, t = 0, 1, 2..., respectively. Assume that each agent has the
same absolute velocity v. When t = 0, all agents are randomly distributed in
an L × L square without boundary restrictions, and their directions, θi(0), are
uniformly distributed in [0, 2pi). The position of each agent is updated according
to
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) +
−→
Vi(t)∆t, (1)
where
−→
Vi(t) is characterized by v and θi(t). In addition, ∆t is set to 1 between
two updates on the positions.
In biological systems, such as flocks of birds and schools of fish, individuals
tend to align their moving directions with that of nearby neighbors. To simulate
the process of direction alignment in flocks, the angle θi(t) of agent i is updated
according to the average direction of its neighbors. Then
θi(t+ 1) = arctan
sinθi(t) +
∑
j∈Wi(t)
sinθj(t)
cosθi(t) +
∑
j∈Wi(t)
cosθj(t)
, (2)
where Wi(t) denotes the neighbors set of the agent i at time t.
In real populations, people are believed to interact much more with their
neighbors than with those who are far away [3]. Based on this point, when
players are located on the nodes of a fixed network, interactions often take place
among immediate players. When players are kept moving, distances can be used
to find neighbors close to the focal one [30]. Note in the Vicsek model [31], the
neighbors set Wi(t) is defined as agents within the circle of radius r centered at
the agent i. To exclude the effects from fluctuations of the neighborhood size,
we assume that each agent will only interact with k nearest neighbors at time
t. Thus Wi(t) can be written as
Wi(t) = argmink{‖xi(t)− xj(t)‖, j ∈ N, j 6= i}, (3)
where the function argmink{•} means to find k smallest elements given in {•},
and ‖ • ‖ denotes the Euclidean distance between j and i in the two-dimensional
space. In simulations, distances between the focal agent and the others are
calculated at first. Then they are sorted in an ascending order, which means
x1 ≤ x2 ≤ x3 ≤ ... ≤ xN−1. Here x denote the distance between i and j, and the
suffix represents its order. If x1 6= x2 6= x3 6= ... 6= xk 6= xk+1, k nearest agents
are chosen as neighbors. If xm = xm+1 = ... = xm+n and 1 ≤ m ≤ k, k−m+1
agents are randomly selected among n+1 agents when (k−m) < n. The sorting
process leads a directed interaction network, however. It means i ∈ Wj(t) does
not imply j ∈ Wi(t). Here, Wi(t) and Wj(t) denote the neighbors sets of i and
j at time t respectively.
Next we introduce the evolutionary rules of our game. Initially all players
are randomly assigned one strategy of the PD with equal probability. The
strategy si of each player can be denoted by an unit vector (1, 0)
T or (0, 1)T ,
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which indicates cooperation or defection respectively. At each time step, each
player plays the PD game with his neighbors Mi(t), accumulating a payoff
Pi =
∑
j∈Mi(t)
sTi Asj . Here we assume that Mi(t) = Wi(t). And following the
common practices [2], the payoff matrix of the PD takes a rescaled form as
A =
(
1 0
b 0
)
, (4)
where 1 < b < 2. Then, every player chooses the strategy that gains the highest
payoff among itself and its neighbors at the next time step [2]. Though the
evolution of strategies and the movement of agents are characterized by two
time scales respectively, they are treated as the same here. It means that every
agent modifies its position and direction after strategy update. This process is
repeated until the system reaches equilibrium.
In our model, distances among each agent determine the network of contacts,
and the agents continuously change their positions. As a result, the neighbors
may be different at each step, though the size of neighborhood is fixed. To char-
acterize the evolution of the interaction network, we calculate the new neighbors
that all agents meet at time t as
n(t) =
N∑
i=1
|Wi(t)−Wi(t)
⋂
Wi(t− 1)|, (5)
where | • | represents the set size.
Fig. 1 shows typical evolutions of n(t), which is divided by N for normal-
ization, and the frequency of cooperators fc. One can find that n(t) decreases
to 0 when t > 200. For comparison, we also plot the evolution of average nor-
malized velocity Va defined in Ref. [31]. As the decrease of n(t), Va also reaches
a steady value, which indicates a stable distribution of moving directions of the
agents. These findings imply that given a sufficient relaxation time, each agent
owns a fixed neighborhood. Later, we will show that without periodic boundary
conditions, the system forms many disconnected components after a long run
time. Thus the variation of neighbors, if any, would be constrained within a
fraction of agents in the population.
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Fig. 1. Representative time evolutions of fc, n and Va for b = 1.2, k = 15 and
v = 0.05.
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The simulations were carried out in a system with N = 500, L = 7. In
each realization, we first check whether the interaction network is fixed after
a suitable relaxation time. The relaxation time is varied from 5000 to 105
generations, and the longer run time corresponds to small neighborhood size k
or velocity v. If n(t) ≤ 1, and this condition can hold for q = 1000 time steps,
the network would be treated as a static one. Then we evaluate the frequency
of cooperators at equilibrium by averaging over the last 1000 generations. All
data points shown in each figure are acquired by averaging over 400 realizations
of independent initial states.
3 Results and Discussions
Fig. 2 illustrates the dependence of the frequency of cooperators fc on the
temptation b in the stationary state for different sizes k of neighborhood with a
fixed absolute velocity v. Under a fixed v and k, fc shows a step structure, and
gradually decreases as the increase of b. However, the size k of neighborhood can
strongly affect the evolution of cooperation. One can see that cooperators are
more prone to die out in the case of large k. But before the system is completely
occupied by defectors, there exists an appropriate k to promote cooperation for
a fixed b. As shown in Fig. 2(a), the cooperation level for k = 9 is always
higher than that for other values of k, if b < 1.35. If 1.35 < b < 1.51, the
highest level of cooperation can be achieved when k = 3. If b > 1.51, defectors
dominate the population, no matter the values of k. These findings suggest a
non-monotonous dependence of the cooperator frequency on the neighborhood
size k. Besides, the absolute velocity v also plays an important role in the
evolution of cooperation. Comparing Fig. 2(b) with Fig. 2(a), one can find
that the increase of v leads an apparent drop of fc for k = 9 or k = 3. But
for k = 15 or k = 21, the increment of v does not cause many changes to
the cooperation level. And when v = 0.35, the highest level of cooperation for
k = 21 is still above 0.6. These findings imply that as the variance of k, the
movement of individuals has different influence on fc.
To investigate the role of the neighborhood size k, Fig. 3 presents the cooper-
ator frequency fc as a function of the neighborhood size k for a fixed temptation
b. Dai et al. reported the promotion of cooperation through enlarging the size
of neighborhood among mobile agents [28], where molecular dynamics is used
to describe repulsion and attraction between agents in flocks. But in our model,
a resonance-like behavior can be observed: there exists a peak of fc at some
values of k. In fact, the same behavior has been found in three typical networks,
where the density of cooperators peaks at some specific values of the average
degree [32]. Here our work can be viewed as extensions of previous work to
dynamical networks. Next we will give a simple explanation for the non-trivial
relation between fc and k. On square lattices and regular ring-graphs, fixed
locations of players provide continuous interactions within local neighborhoods,
and cooperators can cluster together to resist the invasion of defectors [3, 6].
The increment of average degree indeed hampers cooperation, because the well-
mixed limit is nicely approached for a sufficiently large size of neighborhood
[33]. When players are kept moving, however, the cluster of cooperators may be
destroyed by time-variant neighborhoods. The smaller k is, the longer time the
system needs to form a fixed interaction network. The increment of k enhances
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Fig. 2. The frequencies of cooperators fc versus the temptation to defect b
for v = 0.05, 0.1, 0.15 and 0.35 respectively, where the cases k = 21, 15, 9, 3
correspond to different sizes of neighborhood, and b ranges from 1.01 to 1.53
with an interval of 0.02.
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the probability of future encounters between players and their former neighbors.
As a result, interactions among cooperators can be maintained. But defectors
can also exploit more cooperators as k increases, and large values of k reproduce
the mean field situation. To promote cooperation, there should be a compro-
mise between the two limits of k discussed above. That is why the cooperation
level reaches the maximum only at intermediate values of k. At the same time,
the positive effect coming from intermediate local connections on cooperation is
greatly constrained by the absolute velocity v and the temptation b. In Fig. 3,
the value of fc at the peak point decreases as v increases. And when b increases
to 1.2 in Fig. 3(b), the curve of fc is almost leveled off for v = 0.2.
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(a) b=1.05
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Fig. 3. The frequency of cooperators fc as a function of the size of neighbor-
hood k for b = 1.05 and b = 1.2 respectively. And k ranges from 3 to 26 with
an interval of 1.
To study the effect of the absolute velocity v on the cooperation level, Fig.
4(a) demonstrates the frequency of cooperators fc as a function of the tempta-
tion b for different values of v with k = 9. In our model, velocity v measures
the movement speed of players. One can find that for v ≥ 0.1, the cooperator
frequency is lower than that for v = 0, and decreases gradually as v increases.
In fact, when the agents move with a high velocity, they have greater chance
to contact with different neighbors than that in the case of small v. Before
the interaction network gets fixed, neighbors of each agent change quite often,
or might be completely different at each time step. As a result, there is a
small probability of forming compact clusters of cooperators, which leads to
the dominance of defectors. For v ≤ 0.01, however, the situation is reversed.
Compared with the case that agents do not move, the cooperation level is pro-
moted throughout the whole parameter range of b when v = 0.005 or v = 0.01.
It suggests that cooperation among mobile individuals is not only possible but
may even be enhanced, and this finding is in accordance with the previous work
[27, 28, 29]. But such effect relies on the size k of neighborhood, as shown in
Fig. 4(b), which presents the dependence of fc on v for different values of k
with b = 1.17. For k ≤ 9, the cooperation level increases with v, and reaches
the maximum value around v = 0.01. When v = 0.1, a drop of fc appears. For
k = 15 or k = 21, fc changes little when v increases. This can be explained
by the occurrence of mean field situation at large values of k, which offsets the
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enhancement of cooperation from mobility.
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Fig. 4. (a) The frequency of cooperators fc as a function of the temptation b
for k = 9 with various velocities v. b ranges from 1.01 to 1.41 with an interval
of 0.02. (b) The frequency of cooperators fc versus the absolute velocity v for
b = 1.17 with different sizes k of neighborhood. A logarithmic scale is used for
the X axis.
The evolution of system relies on the density ρ of agents at t = 0, which can
be defined as ρ = N/L2. And it has been reported that there is a optimal region
of ρ for cooperation, when the neighbors are chosen according to a prescribed
distance [29]. Fig. 5(a) shows the combining effect of v and ρ on the cooperator
frequency fc for k = 9 and b = 1.07. For a fixed v, one can find that fc
decreases monotonously as ρ increases, and the decreasing velocity increases
with v. Clearly, our finding is different with that reported in Ref. [29], and this
difference is rooted in the definition of neighborhoods. Here ρ indicates how
dense players distribute on the plane when t = 0. In Ref. [29], ρ determines
the average degree < k > of the interaction network, and < k > increases
with ρ. Previous work has revealed that moderate values of average degree can
enhance cooperation [32]. Then the existence of the optimal region of ρ for
cooperation becomes understandable. In our model, however, each agent plays
with a constant number of neighbors. The increasing of ρ produces a dense
population, which brings fast change in neighborhoods for the players. And for
a fixed ρ, a sufficiently large v would hamper the evolution of cooperation, as
discussed above. Hence the system shows low values of fc for large ρ and v.
Fig. 5(b) sheds more light on the role of k when ρ increases. When k ≤ 9, the
increase of ρ leads an apparent decrease of fc. While for k ≥ 21, variation of
densities only causes small fluctuations of fc.
To have an insight into the evolution of cooperation among mobile players,
Fig. 6 provides snapshots of spatial configurations at equilibrium, which is
obtained in one realization. And to eliminate additional mechanisms that favor
cooperation, the value of the temptation is near the extinction threshold of
cooperators. One can find that the system gradually splits into many small
flocks, in which all the agents move toward a same direction. Because the agents
are located in a plane without boundary restrictions, they fly apart and never
meet again. During the process of direction alignment, cooperators can survive
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Fig. 5. (a) The cooperator frequencies fc versus the absolute velocity v and
the density ρ for k = 9, b = 1.07. (b) The cooperator frequencies fc versus the
density ρ for v = 0.05, b = 1.05. v ranges from 0.025 to 0.35 with an interval of
0.025, and ρ ranges from 5 to 75 with an interval of 5.
by forming compact clusters. And the two strategies may coexist at equilibrium,
as shown in the last three figures. One can see that defectors are located on
the border of flocks, or surrounded by cooperators. For cooperators adjacent
to defectors, mutual cooperation make their cooperative neighbors earn higher
payoffs than the income of defectors. According to the best-takes-over rule of
strategy update, the cooperators will follow the strategies of their cooperative
neighbors. That is why cooperation can be maintained in population, and this
mechanism has been found in the lattice structure [2].
4 Conclusion
To summarize, we investigate the effects of mobility on the evolution of cooper-
ation in the direction alignment process of flocks. Numerical simulations show
that cooperation can be maintained in mobile players with simple strategies.
Depending on the temptation to defect and the velocity at which the agents
move, there exist an optimal size of interaction neighborhood to produce the
maximum cooperation level. When compared with the case that all agents do
not move, the cooperation level can even be enhanced by the mobility of indi-
viduals, if the velocity and the size of neighborhood are small. The cooperation
level is also affected by the density ρ of agents, and fc decreases as the increase
of ρ. Moreover, the system exhibits aggregation behavior, and we illustrate the
coexistence of different strategies at equilibrium. Our work may be relevant for
understanding the role of information flows in cooperative, multi-vehicle systems
[34].
This work is supported by the Key Fundamental Research Program of Shang-
hai (Grant No.09JC1408000), the National Key Fundamental Research Pro-
gram (Grant No.2002cb312200) and the National Natural Science Foundation
of China (Grant No.60575036).
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(c) t=100
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(d) t=1300(equilibrium) (e)
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Fig. 6. Snapshots of the evolution of cooperation with b = 1.35, k = 9 and
v = 0.05. Cooperators (red circles) form clusters to resist the invasion of defec-
tors (white circles). At an equilibrium state, players running toward the same
direction stay together, and their velocities are denoted by arrows. The last
three figures present details of the labeled components in (d). To give a clear
figure of spatial configuration, not all directions of the agents are denoted in
(e), (f) and (g).
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